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POLICY, PROLIFERATION AND THE NPT: 
U.S. STRATEGIES AND SOUTH 
ASIAN PROSPECTS 
JOANNE FINEGAN 
The spread, or proliferation, of nuclear weapons technology and 
capability, while not a new issue, has in recent years become more of 
a threat to world stability than ever before. Since the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) took effect nine years 
ago, the specter of proliferation has grown, not diminished, and has 
become a reality in India, and perhaps elsewhere. This global issue is 
compounded by the political, military, economic, and technological 
complexities of the status of nuclear development. Strict adherence to 
the NPT is a necessary prerequisite to discouraging weapons 
production, but even parties to the Treaty have disagreed as to its 
interpretations and obligations, creating gaps in policy capable of 
exploitation not only by non-nuclear-weapon states but also by those 
states with weapons capability. Also, the failure of certain strategic 
states to conform to the spirit and letter of the Treaty has obviated it 
as the single definitive means to non-proliferation. 
For the 109 states which have signed the Treaty, though, the 
obligation not to contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons is 
a legal one. 
This paper will examine the legal obligations of parties to the 
NPT - those of weapons states and non-nuclear states. The 
interpretations of these obligations by the states themselves will be 
analyzed. The case of India will be explored, particularly as it relates 
to criticisms of the NPT by states which have not become parties. The 
capability and motivation behind a threshold country's decision to "go 
nuclear" will be reviewed, with emphasis on the process of prolifera-
tion under which India proceeded. U.S. non-proliferation policy will 
be analyzed, from a historical standpoint and also in light of its most 
recent non-proliferation efforts. The prospects for Pakistan as a 
threshold state will be discussed with respect to its particular 
motivations and apparent directions. Finally, recommendations 
directed toward steps which can help ensure that the purposes of the 
Treaty are realized will be presented, focusing on the development of 
United States policy as a supplier state, and as the foremost 
proponent of nuclear development in the world. 
(1) 
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I. International legal obligations of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty 
International efforts to restrict nuclear energy to peaceful 
purposes have taken several forms: bilateral and multilateral 
treaties, international organizations such as the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), arms limitations negotiations, and export 
policy accords between major suppliers. The cornerstone of these 
efforts is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(Non-Proliferation Treaty)/ which presently has 109 signatories. 
Through the work of the IAEA a safeguards system has been 
established whereby any country may voluntarily submit to inspec-
tions, audits, facility design approval and deposit of nuclear materials 
with the IAEA. The NPT complements the IAEA structure by 
imposing treaty obligations on non-nuclear-weapons states to accept 
safeguards, and by prohibiting the transfer of special fissionable 
material (i.e. plutonium) to any non-nuclear-weapons state without 
IAEA safeguards. Within this international framework for prolifera-
tion control, however, there are no sanctions against violators who 
divert nuclear material to a military purpose, other than announce-
ment to the world community after detection of such violations.2 
Despite these and other shortcomings of the Treaty, it remains the 
most comprehensive of efforts to retard proliferation. 
Legislative history. Much of the substance of the NPT can be 
traced to a resolution adopted unanimously by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 4, 1961.3 This resolution called on all 
states, particularly those possessing nuclear weapons, to conclude an 
international agreement under which nuclear states would refrain 
from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons or transmitting 
essential information to non-nuclear states, and non-nuclear states 
would refrain from attempting the manufacture or control of such 
weapons. As of that date, there were four states possessing nuclear 
weapons: the United States (1945), the USSR ( 1949), the United 
Kingdom (1952) and France (1960).4 The emphasis of this resolution 
was on the non-transfer of control over nuclear weapons, retaining, at 
1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons, 1 July 1968 [1970]. UST 
483, T.I.A.S. # 6839. The treaty appears in Appendix A. 
2. Gleissner, J.D. Recent US efforts to control nuclear proliferation. 10 Vander-
bilt Journal of Transnational Law 271, 276 (1977). 
3. NRes/1665 (XVI) Dec. 5, 1961; Documents on Disarmament, 1961, at 694. 
4. Epstein, W. Why states go - and don't go - nuclear. 430 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 16, 18 (March, 1977). 
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least implicitly, the possibility of transfer of possession for strategic 
alliance purposes. 
The United States and the USSR were the primary negotiators in 
the implementation of the 1961 resolution. Their initial efforts 
produced a "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles" for conducting 
multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and two agenda items for 
discussion in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC): 
reducing the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or lack of 
communication, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.5 
The ENDC was a joint creation of the two superpowers, 
established subsequent to the General Assembly resolution as a 
forum for discussion of an international proliferation agreement. It 
was composed of five NATO members (Canada, France, Great 
Britain, Italy and the United States); five Warsaw Pact members 
(Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and the Soviet Union); 
and eight non-aligned states (Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, 
Mexico, Nigeria, and Sweden).6 The adopted procedure was the 
presentation of separate draft treaties by the U.S. and the USSR, 
with discussion of disparities and compromises taking place within 
the ENDC, NATO, and the General Assembly. The resulting treaty 
was commended by resolution of the General Assembly on June 12, 
1968.7 The treaty entered into force in March, 1970, in accordance 
with paragraph three of Article IX of the Treaty. 
The success of the Treaty depends on several factors. The effect of 
some contingencies are not capable of ready determination; for 
example, changes in the development of the world political situation, 
and the success of the two nuclear superpowers in limiting their arms 
race. Other factors will have a much more decisive impact on the 
Treaty's success: the willingness of the parties to strictly adhere to its 
tenets, and the balancing of obligations to make the Treaty more 
acceptable to certain states which have so far refused to accede to the 
Treaty. 
5. Willrich, M. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control, 
The Mitchie Company, Charlottesville, VA, at 62 (1969). 
6. 16 U.N. GAOR 1129, A/Res/1722 (XVI), Jan. 3, 1962; Documents on 
Disarmament, 1962, at 741. Although France was nominally a part of the ENDC, it 
never took part in the proceedings. 
7. A/Res/2372 (XXII), U.N. Doc. A/7016/Add. 1, at 5, June 10, 1968. Among those 
abstaining from the vote were Brazil, France, India, Spain, and Argentina. 
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A. Nuclear-weapons states and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The specific obligations imposed on nuclear-weapons states are 
set out in Article I of the Treaty, which prohibits among other things 
transfer of nuclear weapons, "other nuclear explosive devices," and 
control over such weapons and devices to non-nuclear-weapons states. 
These terms, not expressly defined in the Treaty, are open to the 
possibility of varying interpretations by the weapons-states parties, 
particularly the USSR and the U.S. 
Among the weapons states, there is virtually no disagreement as 
to the meaning of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices. The 
definition advanced by the United States for "nuclear weapons" is 
included in the Atomic Energy Act: 
Any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for 
transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a 
separable and divisible part of the device) the principal purpose 
of which is for use as, or development of, a weapon, a weapon 
prototype, or a weapon test device. 8 
The Soviet Union has generally agreed with this definition, which 
excludes nuclear delivery systems, as well as propulsion elements such 
as nuclear powered submarines. There has also been agreement between 
the nuclear super-powers that "other nuclear explosive devices" 
include the so-called "peaceful nuclear explosives" iPNEl that differ 
from nuclear weapons only in intended use, not technology. The 
restriction placed on the acquisition of PNEs is a major area of 
contention between the riuclear-weapons states and states such as 
Brazil and India, which view such a restriction as hampering 
technological and economic development and relegating non-nuclear 
weapon nations to permanent inferior status in their utilization of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These arguments will be 
explored in more detail as factors deterring such states from 
becoming parties to the NPT. 
The concept of "control" over nuclear weapons was one of the 
major barriers delaying completion of NPT negotiations between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The United States, mindful of its 
defense obligations under NATO, insisted that deployment of nuclear 
weapons to non-nuclear weapons allies, such as West Germany, did 
not entail the transfer of control as long as the weapons were legally 
owned by the U.S. and remained in the physical custody of U.S. 
8. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, § 11 (d), 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (d) (1964). 
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armed forces. The Soviets were just as adamant that West Germany 
and other European allies not have "access" to nuclear weapons.9 The 
compromise reached on this issue basically reflected the existing U.S. 
policy embodied in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. The NATO 
defense system remained intact, and the issue of control was limited 
to the concept of authority to decide the use of the nuclear weapons -
actual, not potential, control. 10 
Another obligation imposed by Article I is the prohibition against 
assisting, encouraging, or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon state to 
manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. One question repeatedly 
raised during the ENDC discussions was the point at which such a 
prohibitory regulation could be focused. The United States was 
willing to simply prohibit manufacture; the Soviet Union draft 
treaties on this point included "preparations for manufacture" among 
the forms of prohibited assistance. The final agreement did not 
mention preparations for manufacture, relying on the safeguards of 
Article III to detect and control such preparations. 
The technological advances made since the Treaty was negoti-
ated, however, have more closely linked civil power programs with 
weapons development, making it easier for non-nuclear weapons 
states to move closer to weapons acquisition without deviating 
noticeably from the peaceful uses limitation of the Treaty. 11 Specific-
ally, the breeder-reactor, which creates more weapons-grade pluto-
nium than it expends, and reprocessing plants, which allow uranium-
importers to recycle their plutonium from spent fuel rods and achieve 
autonomy within a self-perpetuating fuel cycle, have blurred the line 
between peaceful nuclear development and development of a weapons 
option. Fuel-cycle technology is the "missing link" for many countries 
in the development of an indigenous nuclear program with the 
capability of weapons production. 
There is yet another obligation which, while directed to all 
parties to the Treaty, is aimed particularly at the nuclear weapons 
states. Article VI calls on all parties to pursue negotiations in good 
faith toward cessation of the nuclear arms race, and toward general 
9. Statement by Soviet Union Representative to ENDC, February 17, 1966, 
ENDC/PV. 241, at 24-33; Documents on Disarmament, 1966, at 24-29. 
10. Willrich, M. Non-Proliferation Treaty: Framework for Nuclear Arms Control, 
the Mitchie Company, Charolttesville, Va., at 76 (1969). 
11. Office of Technology Assessment Report on Nuclear Proliferation Safeguards: 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal 
Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 1st Sess. 14 
(1977) (statement of Theodore Taylor). 
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and complete disarmament. With respect to the former goal, some 
progress has been made; with respect to the latter, virtually none. In 
moving toward resolution in these areas, it is not as important to 
scrutinize the history and negotiations on the SALT talks, for 
example, as it is to scrutinize the philosophy underlying the position 
of the two governments involved. The main premise on which the 
governments of both the U.S. and the USSR base their nuclear arms 
limitation philosophy is that a nuclear stockpile is primarily for 
military purposes and not for political clout. This leads each of the 
two countries to conclude that a state can never have enough nuclear 
weapons to maintain effective strike capabilities against the other 
power.12 It is not satisfaction with either offensive or defensive 
capabilities, nor a desire for "stabilized arms control" that has led 
these states to the negotiating table. Such incentives would have 
resulted in the conclusion of an agreement years ago. Rather, what 
has brought these two nations to accord has been the more pedestrian 
matter of economics. Consider the following synopsis of a document 
presented by the Russian Foreign Office: 
The motives may have been selfish; the reasoning was wholly 
excellent. The ever-increasing expense of armaments (so Count 
Muravieff, the Russian Foreign Minister, argued) was touching 
public prosperity at its very source; the intellectual and physical 
powers of the people, labour, and capital, were being turned aside 
from their natural functions and consumed unproductively; 
hundreds of millions were being spent on engines of destruction 
which, today considered as the highest triumph of science, were 
destined for the rubbish-heap tomorrow, as a result of some new 
discovery. The armaments of each power were increasing in size, 
but they succeeded less and less in accomplishing their object, the 
preservation of peace; economic crises, due largely to the expense 
of excessive armaments, and the constant dangers resulting from 
the accumulation of war material, made the armed peace an 
overwhelming; indeed a futile, burden, since the continuation of 
the race was leading inevitably to catastrophe. 13 
12. Thayer, F.C. Proliferation and the future: destruction or transformation? 430 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 133, 137 (March, 1977). 
13. Martin, A. Legal Aspects of Disarmament. The British Institute of Internation-
al and Comparative Law, London, 1963, at 16-17. The full text of the document is 
reprinted in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1898, at 541-542. 
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This analysis of continued stockpiling of arms is no less cogent now 
than when it was first asserted as a prelude to the Hague Peace 
Conference, in 1898. If anything, these arguments are even more 
compelling today than they were eighty-one years ago, given the 
advances in technology during the intervening years, and the rate at 
which obsolescence occurs in the tactical military weapons field. The 
two superpowers, however, have begun to yield to economic reality 
without altering their basic perception of nuclear weapons acquisition 
as primarily a military rather than a political tool. 
Such an attitude is to be contrasted with that of the other nuclear 
weapons states as well as with that of several of the near-nuclear 
states. What has been termed "the French view" argues in effect that 
nuclear weapons are basically political, or terrorist, in nature, hence 
a modest nuclear force would be highly effective. To that, U.S. policy 
makers and defense analysts respond that a. small force is of little 
consequence precisely because it is too small to be militarily 
effective.14 Such a response assumes conclusions based on a "rational 
war" scenario first promulgated by U.S. defense intellectuals to 
rationalize mushrooming military budgets in a time of peace. This 
scenario became popular during the late 1950's and assumed a U.S. 
first strike against the U.S.S.R. aimed at Soviet missile centers, with 
a "bonus effect" of substantial damage any such strike would cause to 
nearby population centers. The second strike would be aimed at our 
population centers, which would be evacuated in anticipation of such 
retaliation. This strike would not do significant damage, it was 
argued, because of the initial destruction of the opponent's weapons. 
U.S. cities would be repopulated once fallout had subsided. The first 
strike scenario justified the acquisition of large amounts of weapons 
to destroy similarly large amounts on the Soviet side while conve-
niently ignoring the impossibility of total evacuation of U.S. cities. 
In the 1960's an opposite approach was developed by defense 
tacticians which assumed a Soviet first strike against our missile 
bases. To prepare for this possibility, the prospect of evacuation of 
cities was abandoned; downtown buildings were designated as 
"fallout shelters" and citizens were encouraged to build bomb shelters 
in suburban and rural areas for protection against the bonus effect a 
first strike by the Soviets would have. The basic contradictions 
between the first and second strike scenarios were never clarified; 
meanwhile the missile reserves grew. Moreover, the proponents of the 
14. Thayer, F.C. Proliferation and the future: destruction or transformation? 430 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 133, 137 (March, 1977). 
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first and second strike theories ignored the fact that the only 
offensive use of nuclear weapons to date had been directed not toward 
the conventional weapons bases which a rational war first strike 
assumes, but toward the Japanese population centers of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. The terrorist nature of these attacks was not lost on 
countries such as France, China and India when it came to the 
development of their own nuclear strategy. 
B. India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The case of India presents a prototype by which the motivations 
and capabilities of non-nuclear-weapons states may be measured, 
particularly those countries which are not signatories to the NPT and 
are on the threshold of weapons proliferation. India, which had been 
one of the strongest and most active proponents of non-proliferation 
in the 1950's and early sixties, began to reevaluate its policy in terms 
of nuclear deterrence after China exploded its first atomic bomb. 15 
India was part of the ENDC which conducted the discussions on 
negotiation of the Treaty, but did not become a party to the Treaty. 
At the time of the ENDC Conferences, India was a non-nuclear state 
beset by security problems, particularly with regard to China, which 
had attacked India with conventional weapons in 1962 and which had 
acquired nuclear capability by the time of the onset of the ENDC 
Conferences. During the conferences, India was in vocal opposition to 
inherent discrimination within the draft treaty proposals, in that 
limitations were placed only on the ambitions of non-nuclear 
countries and not on those of existing nuclear powers.16 This was 
partially a result of the process used by the ENDC in negotiating the 
treaty. The two nuclear superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, presented separate draft treaty proposals similtaneous-
ly and work within the ENDC consisted largely of give and take 
between these two countries regarding their expectations and obliga-
tions, without, in India's eyes, sufficient regard to what was expected 
of them in return by the non-nuclear nations. The result was a treaty 
acceptable to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but unacceptable to a 
number of states, particularly those with both a substantial civil 
nuclear power program and ongoing security problems. India was a 
15. Epstein, W. Why states go - and don't go - nuclear. 430 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 16, 18-19 (March, 1977). 
16. Boskey, B. and Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control. 
The Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 30. 
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member of the latter group of states at the time of its rejection of the 
NPT. 
India was critical both of the general assumptions underlying the 
Treaty and several of its specific provisions. One general premise 
underlying the NPT was the notion that the United States and the 
USSR would separately agree to protect their own allies from nuclear 
blackmail or attack by the other. This umbrella concept was also an 
outgrowth of the military doctrine viewpoint examined above, and is 
fallacious for two reasons. First, it minimizes the terrorist character 
of nuclear weapons, the fact that they are most effective when used 
against civilian populations. It is naive to believe that the U.S. would 
jeopardize its own civilian population by putting it at the mercy of an 
ally whose foreign policies are beyond U.S. control, particularly in 
light of the isolationist feelings which have developed subsequent to 
the Vietnam war. Furthermore, an umbrella concept defies the 
established fact that countries may have permanent interests, but not 
permanent allies. India, and some of the threshold countries, have 
been reluctant to place their security at the mercy of one or another of 
the super-powers, for nationalist reasons and in recognition of the 
tenuous nature of allegiances. Prior to the adoption of the draft 
treaties in the ENDC, India had demanded an adequate security 
agreement, in effect a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee, in return for 
signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but it was not forthcoming. The 
Soviets would not cooperate in furnishing a pointedly anti-Chinese 
promise to India, and the U.S. would not consider it without an option 
to be absolved of its obligation should the Soviets refuse to come to 
India's aid under attack." The U.S. was also reluctant to agree to 
come to India's aid, feeling that it would then be obligated to make 
similar commitments to other threshold states, possibly involving the 
U.S. in remote wars in which it had no vested interests. 
The second fallacious premise on which the Treaty was based was 
the assumption that the U.S. and the USSR would join in a military 
alliance to destroy another country's attempt to develop nuclear 
weapons, if other attempts at deterrence were ineffective. If the two 
superpowers were serious about halting proliferation, the threat of 
joint retaliation against a proliferating country would be the ultimate 
deterrent. But the Soviets were already concerned about possible 
Chinese reaction to a prospective alliance, and the U.S. was unwilling 
17. Dougherty, J.E. The treaty and the non-nuclear states. 11 Orbis 360, 365 
(1967). 
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to undermine the confidence of its European allies for the sake of a 
truly effective deterrent to proliferation. 
To India, several specifics of the Treaty were objectionable, as 
well as some of its underlying premises. India found the balance of 
obligations weighted heavily to the detriment of non-nuclear-weapon 
states. In that respect, attention was first drawn to Article I of the 
Treaty, where three loopholes in particular were criticized. The first 
was that although the nuclear-weapon states were prohibited by its 
terms from transferring control over such weapons to any state, the 
prohibition against assistance in nuclear weapons production was 
against non-nuclear-weapons states only; that is, assistance by one 
nuclear weapons state to another in the matter of production of 
nuclear weapons was not prohibited. 18 The second loophole concerned 
the use of the terms "transfer" and "control" in Article I. India has 
noted that these terms have specific legal connotations not encompas-
sing the prospect of establishing nuclear weapon bases in the 
non-nuclear-weapon countries, control being retained by the con-
cerned nuclear-weapon state.19 India has criticized this "indirect 
proliferation" and the deficiency in the Treaty of its treatment of the 
personal character of proliferation, but not its territorial character. 
India's broad view of proliferation includes all its forms: vertical, 
horizontal, direct, indirect; the distinctions made in the Treaty are 
indistinguishable in India's view. This is evident in India's third 
objection to Article I: the lack of prohibition against the stockpiling of 
nuclear arsenals by the nuclear-weapon states. India finds it counter-
productive to differentiate between vertical proliferation, the increase 
in nuclear arms stockpiles by weapons states which the Treaty 
ignores, and horizontal proliferation, the increase in states developing 
nuclear weaponry which the Treaty expressly forbids. India has also 
asserted that vertical proliferation is in contravention to principles 
enunciated by the General Assembly, particularly in its Resolution 
2153A (XXI), which begins: 
Noting that i.t has not yet been possible to reach an 
agreement on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, 
Viewing with apprehension the possibility that such a 
situation may lead not only to an increase of nuclear arsenals 
18. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8 
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 225 (1968). 
19. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8 
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 285 (1968). 
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and to a spread of nuclear weapons over the world but also to an 
increase in the number of nuclear-weapon Powers, ... 20 
In India's eyes, this resolution contemplated a prohibition of further 
production of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states. The con-
struction of the resolution does indicate that to the General Assem-
bly, vertical proliferation is the foremost component in the conception 
of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Indian position on prolifera-
tion by the nuclear weapons states is that the loopholes provided in 
Article I create an illusory obligation, unlike the exacting and 
comprehensive restrictions placed on the non-nuclear weapon states 
elsewhere in the Treaty. 
The imbalance of obligations is reflected in other aspects of the 
Treaty. For instance, India objected to the imposition of IAEA 
safeguards over the peaceful nuclear industry of non-nuclear-weapon 
states, considering it an infringement of national sovereignty. The 
safeguards were made mandatory for non-nuclear-weapon states to 
detect and prevent diversion of peaceful nuclear plants and materials 
to clandestine military use. These safeguards were considered 
somewhat extraneous for nuclear weapon states on the assumption 
that states already possessing nuclear weapons would have no reason 
to develop a secret arsenal. In addition, the Soviets have so far 
refused to allow international inspection on their own territory, and 
the U.S., although advocating inspection safeguards, was willing to 
concede its application to the nuclear-weapons states. This was seen, 
in India, as "an invidious discrimination of a humiliating character 
based on an unfounded distrust of non-nuclear weapon states and the 
desire to safeguard the national interests of the nuclear weapon 
states. . . . This is yet another manifestation of inequality in the 
draft Treaty."21 India's objections to this inequality have acquired 
more validity in recent years due to the increasing awareness of 
possible acquisition of nuclear explosives by individuals through 
theft. 22 
The security assurances, or lack of them, were also a subject of 
India's concern. As a non-aligned state, India noted that non-nuclear-
weapon states, who are asked to deprive themselves of the right to 
produce and acquire nuclear weapons, should acquire adequate 
20. A!Res12153A (XXI) Jan. 4, 1966; Documents on Disarmament, 1966, at 721. 
21. The draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons: a critical appraisal. 8 
Indian Journal of International Law 223, 229 (1968). 
22. Dunn, L.A. Nuclear proliferation and world politics. 430 Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 96, 103-105 (March 1977). 
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collective security measures against nuclear attacks. Since the Treaty 
is silent on this issue, any collective measures must be in accord with 
the U.N. Charter. There is nothing in the Charter which assures 
immediate help against aggression as a matter of course. The 
. Security Council, of which each of the states with veto power is a 
nuclear-~~pon state, would most likely be paralyzed in the event of 
a nuclear attack. This leaves non-nuclear-weapon states little choice 
but to align themselves with one or another military pact, such as 
NATO or the Warsaw Pact. India, unwilling to do this, preferred 
security guarantees to come from powers "in different camps,"23 but 
such a joint U.S.-Soviet guarantee has not been feasible. Even if it 
were, such an arrangement would have to be reciprocal, in that one 
party would be obliged to aid India in a nuclear attack only if the 
other party averred in the situation. India has been justifiably 
unwilling to depend for its security on the continuation of U.S.-Soviet 
detente. And, as far as U.S. support goes, India has been wary of 
alignment with the U.S. since the 1971 India-Pakistan War, when the 
U.S. aided Pakistan. 
The dichotomy between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-
nuclear-weapons states created by the Treaty in terms of obligations, 
responsibilities, and benefits, institutionalized an inferior status for 
India which it was not willing to maintain. Their representative to 
the ENDC stated before that body that: 
By all means let us talk of regulation of armaments -
universally; by all means let us talk of non-armament -
universally; by all means let us talk of arms restraint and arms 
control- universally. But any attempt to impose non-armament 
particularly on unarmed countries, and any tendency to talk only 
in terms of imposing nonarmament on some countries - weak 
countries, countries which have faced, are facing and will face 
threats to their security and loss or occupation of their territory, 
countries which face threats to their independence and territorial 
integrity, countries whose security is in danger - is, to use an 
American phrase, "counter-productive."24 
India was not a nuclear weapon state when these objections were 
voiced, although it subsequently became one. The reservations 
23. Dougherty, J.E. The treaty and the non-nuclear states. 11 Orbis 360, 365 
(1967), quoting from a statement by the Prime Minister in the Lok Sabha on July 17, 
1967, quoted in Weekly India News, July 28, 1967, at 6. 
24. Statement by Ambassador Trivedi, ENDC/PV, 314, July 18, 1967, at 5. 
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expressed by that country take on increasing relevance when 
examining current non-nuclear-weapon states for their motivations 
and capabilities to "go nuclear." Understanding the present situation 
among the non-nuclear-weapon states is the next step in developing a 
sense of perspective on the process of proliferation. 
C. Non-nuclear-weapon states and the NPT 
Of the 109 parties to the NPT, only three have nuclear weapons 
capability. The remaining 106 signatories include 35 states with 
peaceful domestic nuclear power programs. In addition 9 states have 
peaceful power programs but are not parties to the Treaty. 25 
Horizontal proliferation within the near future will come from those 
countries with some form of peaceful nuclear program now in effect, 
because it is only in those countries that a nuclear weapons program 
can conceivably be developed within a short period of time. The 
Treaty obligations of non-nuclear-weapon states will first be discus-
sed, and the spectrum of states in the non-nuclear category will be 
analyzed as to their propensity toward proliferation. 
Treaty obligations. The obligation imposed on the non-nuclear 
weapon states in Article II parallel those for the weapons states in 
Article I. Non-weapon states pledge not to receive the transfer of 
nuclear weapons, or control over them from any transfer whatever. 
More importantly, they cannot manufacture or otherwise acquire 
nuclear weapons, or seek or receive assistance in such manufacture. 
This prohibition applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to 
"other nuclear explosive devices." The prohibition against receiving 
encompasses the receiving of nuclear weapons from nuclear-weapon 
states not party to the Treaty. Like Article I, however, there is a 
loophole as to the territorial character of proliferation: a non-nuclear-
weapon state can permit a base even for a nuclear-weapon state not 
party to the Treaty, allowing that state to harbor and operate nuclear 
weapons. This is of grave consequence to countries like India, which 
are not committed to any power bloc. 
The other salient feature of the Treaty with regard to non-
nuclear-weapon states is contained in Article III, in which these 
states undertake to accept IAEA safeguards for their peaceful nuclear 
power programs. As previously stated, these safeguards are not 
25. Congressional Research Service,. Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear 
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th 
Congress, 1st Sess. 54-66 (1975). These figures include states which will have 
operational power plants by 1980. 
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imposed on the nuclear-weapon states. The 1975 NPT Review 
Conference has suggested that these safeguards be extended to all 
countries with peaceful programs, no matter what their status. In the 
final declaration of the review conference, it was declared that: 
The conference attaches considerable importance to the continued 
application of safeguards under Article III, on a non-
discriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all states party to 
the Treaty .... The Conference expresses the hope that all 
states having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and 
maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes 
the readiness of the IAEA to assist states in so doing.26 
The reservations expressed by some of the non-nuclear-weapon 
states in regard to their treaty obligations parallel those that played 
a part in India's rejection of the Treaty. More relevant to this 
discussion is a delineation from among those non-nuclear-weapon 
states as to which are more likely to go nuclear in the future. The 
next additions to the group of powers possessing nuclear weapons 
have been called the "Nth powers" by some;27 but because that term 
indirectly assumes that there will be an addition to this group, here 
the group of possible proliferators will be referred to as threshold 
countries. 
Analysis of non-nuclear countries. Among the present non-
nuclear states, the majority does not have domestic peaceful nuclear 
programs. The likelihood of proliferation among these countries in 
the near future is virtually nonexistent, as their indigenous technolo-
gies do not encompass nuclear power or a nuclear fuel cycle. There 
are a few countries in this group that do have uranium reserves 
within their territory28 , thus these countries do have a future fuel 
source. But without accompanying technology, these uranium re-
serves should not be a source of concern over those states' future in 
the sphere of weapons proliferation. 
Of greater concern to this analysis are those countries with 
domestic nuclear power programs and whether or not such countries 
26. Review conference of the parties to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons: final declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061, 1062-1063 (1975). 
27. See, e.g., Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 84, 84-95 (March 1977). 
28. Central African Empire, Bagon, Niger. 
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are parties to the NPT. !insert Figure ll"" For some of these countries, 
the military incentives to proliferate are slight because they are 
adequately covered by the nuclear umbrellas established through 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or other security guarantees. The 
Non-Proliferation Treaty does not interfere with existing arrange-
ments within NATO for defense of United States allies during 
nuclear attack. Initial Soviet drafts of the Treaty appeared to prohibit 
existing arrangements for the deployment in allied territory by the 
U.S. of nuclear weapons under its custody and control, for the 
training of allied troops for defense against nuclear attack, and for 
allied consultations and planning for such defense. But the comprom-
ise worked out in this area contained no such prohibitions. 
To further clarify the matter, an interpretation of the Treaty, 
worked out within the NATO states and given to the Soviets, stated 
unequivocably that: 
Articles I and II do not deal with arrangements for deployment of 
nuclear weapons within allied territory as these do not involve 
any transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them unless and 
until a decision were made to go to war, at which time the Treaty 
would no longer be controlling . . . . [Articles I and II] do not 
deal with allied consultations and planning on nuclear defense so 
long as no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them 
results. 30 
This interpretation does not preclude substitution of new nuclear 
weapons for those the United States now has deployed on allied 
territory, nor does it preclude the consultations and planning 
undertaken by the seven-nation NATO Nuclear Planning Group in 
developing political guidelines for the possible use of tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe.31 It is the security afforded by the NATO nuclear 
umbrella that is the major disincentive for these countries to 
proliferate. 
29. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The Nuclear Age. 
Stockholm, Almquist and Wiksell International, 1974. Published in collaboration with 
the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
30. Hearings on Executive H (The Non-Proliferation Treaty) before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sess. 5-6 (Part 1, 1968); 
Hearings on the Military Implications of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. 
11-12 (1969). 
31. Wohlstetter, A. Spreading the bomb without quite breaking the rules. 25 
Foreign Policy 88, 92 (1977). 
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FIGURE 129 
Non-nuclear-weapons states Number of Indigenous uranium NPT 
with domestic power programs reactors"' resources party 
Argentina 7 yes no 
Australia 2 yes yes 
Austria 4 no yes 
Belgium 8 no yes 
Brazil 4 yes no 
Bulgaria 5 no yes 
Canada 20 yes yes 
Chile 1 no no 
Columbia 1 no yes 
Czechoslovakia 8 yes yes 
Denmark 3 yes yes 
Egypt 1 no yes 
Finland 4 yes yes 
Fed. Rep. Germany 61 no yes 
German Dem. Rep. 4 no yes 
Greece 1 no yes 
Hungary 3 no yes 
Indonesia 1 no yes 
Iran 1 no yes 
Iraq 1 no yes 
Israel 2 yes no 
Italy 23 yes yes 
Japan 50 yes yes 
Korea, South 3 no yes 
Mexico 4 yes yes 
Netherlands 8 no yes 
Norway 2 no yes 
Pakistan 2 no yes 
Philippines 1 no yes 
Poland 4 no yes 
Portugal 1 no no 
Romania 1 no yes 
South Africa 2 yes no 
Spain 16 yes no 
Sweden 14 yes yes 
Switzerland 14 no yes 
Taiwan [Republic of China] 6 no yes 
Thailand 2 no no 
Turkey 1 yes no 
Uruguay 1 no yes 
Venezuela 1 no yes 
Vietnam, South 1 no yes 
Yugoslavia 5 yes yes 
Zaire 1 yes yes 
"'Includes research reactors and operational power reactors through 1980. 
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Since August, 1969, any NATO party has the right to end its own 
obligations upon one year's notice. Major non-nuclear European allies 
of.the United States, particularly West Germany, rely upon NATO for 
their nuclear deterrent against possible Soviet attack by conventional 
or nuclear weapons. But should enough countries withdraw from 
NATO to bring it to an end as an effective alliance, or should the 
United States alone withdraw, West Germany, Italy, and some of the 
smaller countries might well look to their own nuclear defenses. West 
Germany's apprehension on this score was such that the United 
States felt compelled to reassure that country that should NATO 
dissolve, the national interests of non-nuclear NATO members might 
be affected to such an extent as to justify their withdrawal from the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty.32 
For the time being, however, the NATO alliance is secure, and 
the United States has taken steps to indicate that there has been no 
weakening of commitment to the alliance. If the status quo is 
maintained, the next proliferator will not come from the ranks of the 
NATO allies. But there is another group of states which do not have 
the firm commitment of a nuclear power, and where proliferation may 
be more of a problem. From the point of view of a non-nuclear state, 
the ideal security guarantee would probably be a promise by one or 
more nuclear powers to come to its assistance should it be attacked, or 
threatened, by still another nuclear power. To the extent that such a 
guarantee extended the "nuclear umbrella" over the non-nuclear 
state, it could both deter a nuclear strike and provide reassurance 
against nuclear blackmail, that is using the threat of nuclear force to 
create unequal bargaining positions. To the extent that the promised 
assistance included support against conventional attacks, it could 
ease fears of local incursions. And to the extent that the promises 
were made more tangible to the non-nuclear country in the form of 
military aid and troop deployments in strategic areas, they could 
become even more meaningful than more formal commitments.33 But, 
for many reasons, adequate security guarantees are lacking, and 
proliferation may occur as the countries in question hunt for 
alternatives to the nuclear umbrella. One reason for this is that the 
nuclear-weapon states themselves have been reluctant to assert 
wholesale nuclear assurances, or to treat neutrals with more 
32. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Exec. Rep. No. 9, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations 12, (1968). 
33. Boskey, B. & Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control The 
Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 122. 
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deference than allies. The United States, for one, has been unwilling 
to be drawn into stronger guarantees against a nuclear strike, or to 
furnish troops to repel a conventional attack, lest such measures 
automatically involve it in a conflict between a nuclear power and a 
non-nuclear one. Such risk can be reduced by a joint U.S.-Soviet 
nuclear guarantee, but so far the only joint guarantee is that 
expressed by the U.N. Security Council in conjunction with the NPT.'14 
This resolution does not adequately insure security for several 
reasons. The first is that if offers guarantees only against nuclear 
aggression or the threat of such aggression, leaving open the 
possibility of a conventional attack. For some states, a conventional 
attack is what they fear most, and against which they look to tactical 
nuclear weapons for their deterrent capability. Another inadequacy is 
that the resolution covers only parties to the treaty, leaving exposed 
countries that are the most likely to proliferate, as was India when 
the resolution was adopted. Also, the resolution implies collective 
assistance by the three nuclear-weapon states that are parties to the 
Treaty, and provides that such assistance will be given through the 
Security Council, where each of the guarantors, as well as France and 
China, has a veto. The constructionists of the resolution must well 
have been aware that the resolution, intended to assure security for 
non-nuclear-weapon states and secure their adherence to the Treaty, 
added nothing to existing rights and obligations accorded by the U.N. 
Charter. And besides the collective self-defense envisioned by the 
resolution, the inherent right of individual self-defense is reaffirmed, 
though, ironically, the resolution applies in the event of a nuclear 
attack, when non-nuclear states will have already contracted away 
the right to defend themselves on the same military level as their 
nuclear attackers, through adherence to the Treaty. The prospect that 
this resolution would effectively reduce the fears and concerns of 
non-nuclear states and so win their accession to the Treaty would 
seem to be small, and indeed this resolution did not induce countries 
with severe security problems to adhere to the Treaty. 
For these countries the incentives to proliferate are strong. 
Several of these are considered "outlaw states," in bad graces with the 
rest of world opinion as expressed by the U.N. General Assembly. 
The list here includes Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan, states which 
may tend to see an indigenous nuclear weapons option as the 
ultimate method of self-defense against hostile states that would like 
34. United Natwns Security Council Resolutwn on Security Assurances. SIRES! 
255, (XXll), June 19, 1968. The resolution appears at Appendix B. 
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to see an end to the threatened regime or state. This second category 
of non-nuclear states, as opposed to those for whom the nuclear 
umbrella alliances are operative, had a military incentive for a move 
toward nuclear weapons, but this is not necessarily the only 
inducement toward proliferation. For some, the incentives to prolifer-
ate closely follow India's reservations about the NPT, and the 
political, military, and economic problems for which it turned to 
nuclear technology as a solution. 
II. The Threshold States 
There are two very different kinds of incentives for nuclear 
proliferation. The more traditional view considers nuclear weapons in 
their political-military strategem of potential, another step on the 
continuum of tactical military equipment that probably began with 
the spear or sharpened stone. The other kind of incentive is economic, 
and less discernible at first glance. Peaceful nuclear programs have 
deVf'!loped rapidly in certain areas of the world because they have 
been proven cost-effective, or have been perceived as such. Yet the 
cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy is enhanced by completing the 
fuel cycle with indigenous chemical separation plants, breeder 
reactors, and the like, all of which will pull countries closer to actual 
weapons production. There is also the problem of peaceful nuclear 
explosions (PNE) and the ways they are perceived in different states. 
A. Political and military motivation 
It has already been noted that several states view the military 
incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons strong enough to override 
the various disincentives."But it has also been noted that the United 
States, at least, perceives nuclear weapons effectiveness in terms of 
conventional strike force, dismissing a small nuclear capability as of 
little consequence. Why, then, is there a persistent logic in perceiving 
nuclear weapons, in even a small capability, as a military tool? This 
can be demonstrated best in relation to a specific state, such as 
Pakistan, with due regard to its specific problems and solutions. 
Pakistan is a small country with a centralized population and a 
history of animosity towards India, but with amicable relations 
toward its other neighbor, Iran. Pakistan has closely followed India's 
example in the nuclear realm. For example, Pakistan purchased a 
nuclear reactor from Canada shortly after India did; Pakistan's power 
plant became operational just two years after India's. India's example 
in refusing to become a party to the NPT has been followed by 
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Pakistan. As of now India has developed nuclear explosives and 
Pakistan has not. Although the balance of power in South Asia 
favored India even before its 197 4 nuclear explosion, the nuclear 
capability has sharply increased India's advantage. At least for the 
forseeable future, India's nuclear option has made it unlikely that 
Pakistan would attack India in order to liberate Kashmir, one of 
three regions claimed by Pakistan.35 It has also added another 
element to the conventional war scenario. The acquisition of nuclear 
weapons by Pakistan at this point would accomplish little in 
equalizing their military strengths. But without at least a viable 
nuclear option, the military gap between the two countries will 
widen, weakening the Pakistani position. 
Pakistan began its nuclear program in 1965 with a research 
reactor,36 and that same year concluded an agreement with Canada 
for the purchase of a heavy water reactor7 which became operational 
in 1971. Since that time, Pakistan has announced its intention to 
install one reactor every two years, beginning in 1980 until the end of 
the century; they have also negotiated with France for the purchase 
of a chemical separation plant, a plan which has since fallen through. 
Pakistan's nuclear expansion plans exceed even the IAEA estimates 
for optimum energy production. And the IAEA estimates have been 
criticized as being too excessive, at least in Pakistan's case, where the 
rural economy is stable, and where per capita consumption of energy 
actually decreased at the same time that country's GNP rose.38 It is 
even questionable whether nuclear energy is at all cost-efficient in 
Pakistan's case, where domestic production of its oil needs is already 
at 40% and still increasing and where dam-created hydroelectric 
power efficiently provides both power and irrigation capability for 
less than half the cost of a nuclear reactor with the same power 
output.39 
The Pakistan government, while asserting that its nuclear 
expansion program is intended for the production of energy, may well 
be moving toward its own detonation of nuclear explosives. And 
35. The others are Janahadh and Hyderabad. 
36. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear 
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th 
Congress, 1st Sess. 61-62 (1975). 
37. Khalilzad, Z. Pakistan: the making of a nuclear power. 16 Asian Survey 580, 
580 (1976). 
38. Ibid, p. 582. 
39. Pakistan Yearbook 1973. Karachi National Publication House Ltd., 1974, at 
300-313. 
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while its current policy, when measured ::tgainst IAEA standards, 
seems merely a case of too much too fast, the main reason for 
interpreting Pakistan's move in the nuclear field as pointing toward a 
weapons capacity is its relations with India. The Indian explosion 
affects many countries, but none more so than Pakistan. India's 
expanding nuclear program even prior to the 1974 explosion had been 
a source of concern to Pakistan. In 1966 Foreign Minister Bhutto said 
that if India produced a nuclear bomb Pakistan would follow suit 
even if it had to "eat grass" to do so ... ' Bhutto was the chief engineer of 
Pakistan's nuclear program, first urging President Ayub Khan to 
develop a nuclear device, then, upon his own assumption of power, 
working to expand the program through the stepped-up reactor 
program and the reprocessing plant purchase from France. Bhutto 
also rejected the notion of a no-war pact with India because of the 
latter's nuclear explosion, asserting that under the circumstances 
such a pact would mean capitulation for Pakistan. 
The Pakistani government rejected Indian assurances that the 
explosion was for peaceful purposes. Pakistan not only feels 
threatened by Indian capabilities, but also does not trust Indian 
intentions, claiming that in the past many assurances by India have 
remained unhonored. India's assertion that the explosion was only a 
"peaceful test" has not assuaged Pakistani fears at all, for Pakistan, 
unlike India, does not distinguish between PNEs and weapons 
detonation. Pakistan is also concerned about India's medium range 
missiles, with a nuclear delivery system capability twice that of 
Pakistan's. 41 
Proliferation in Pakistan will validate the chain-reaction theory 
in nuclear proliferation. Already, Pakistan's atomic energy talent is 
first rate, and with fuel-cycle capability provided by the French 
reprocessing plant, it may have by 1980-1981 a capacity to explode a 
nuclear device.'i To meet the Indian challenge, Pakistan has adopted 
a three-pronged policy. First, Pakistan developed and expanded its 
own nuclear option with a reactor purchase in 1975 and announced 
its plans to build a reactor every two years. In the same year, 
negotiations with France for more sophisticated fuel-cycle technology 
40. Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 84, 89 (March, 1977). 
41. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear 
Proliferation, for the Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 94th 
Congress, 1st Sess. 59-62 (1975). 
42. Kapur, A. Nth powers of the future. 430 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 84, 89-90 (March, 1977). 
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began. Next, Pakistan began to publicly demand, in reaction to the 
Indian explosion, that India open its nuclear installations to interna-
tional inspection and renounce any intention to produce nuclear 
weapons. It also suggested that South Asia be made a nuclear-weapon 
free zone, in the process gaining international support for its 
anti-proliferation position while simultaneously generating justifica-
tion for going nuclear itself should India reject the demands. External 
guarantees were also sought against nuclear threat or aggression, 
minimizing the effect of Indian nuclear blackmail which Pakistan 
perceived as imminent. Pakistan joined with the Persian Gulf states 
in a mutual defense treaty which provides for Pakistan's use of 
Mirage Jet fighters with nuclear delivery capability in an emergency 
situation. Finally, Pakistan also began seeking conventional arms as 
a trade-off to threats to go nuclear. It persuaded the U.S. to lift its 
arms embargo, stating that the embargo had not contributed to 
regional stability, and that the disparity in military capability 
between India and Pakistan was forcing that country into a 
military-nuclear program. Pakistan also contracted with France, 
China, Iran and Saudi Arabia for aircraft, air-to-surface missiles and 
fighter-bombers to modernize its armed forces. 
Even with all this activity, Pakistan will not be India's military 
equal for some time to come, if at all. If the Indian superiority in 
conventional weapons continues even after Pakistan acquires a 
nuclear option, in case of a war between the two countries, Pakistan 
may choose to detonate nuclear weapons rather than accept conven-
tional defeat. But Pakistan's first-strike capability will doubtless be 
unable to eliminate India's entire nuclear response capability. In that 
event, India's response would be devastating to Pakistan. Neverthe-
less, a first-strike capability for Pakistan would signal to India, as 
India's explosion did to the rest of the world, that Pakistan is a force 
to be reckoned with and that it will not allow technological advances 
by India to intimidate it. And for the near future, it is unlikely that 
India will flaunt its nuclear capability to disrupt the balance of power 
in that region. It is in India's self interest to protect Pakistan as a 
strategic buffer, as India has no desire to share common borders with 
Iran and the Soviet Union. So, even a small nuclear force in 
Pakistan's case may achieve an effective deterrent against a hostile 
nuclear power, should India proceed toward operational nuclear 
bombs. 
The political incentives to proliferate also play a part in 
Pakistan's case. Acquisition of atomic weapons would make Pakistan 
the first Muslim state with such a capability. This would increase 
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Pakistan's prestige and influence in the Muslim world while under-
mining Iran's conventional military superiority. And as long as 
nuclear weapons are perceived in the world as conveying special 
status or prestige to the developer, countries like Pakistan will seek 
justification for their entry into the club. 
B. Economic motivation 
Motivation inducing proliferation may also be manifested 
through economic justifications. The major economic incentive to 
proliferate is found in the overlap between peaceful programs and 
military programs utilizing nuclear energy. As nuclear technology 
develops, the pursuit of economic advantages brings countries closer 
to completing the fuel cycle technology that also enables weapons 
production. An understanding of the processes that link peaceful uses 
with weapons potential is necessary to an analysis of the economic 
forces at work. 
Any state with a nuclear power reactor has within its territory 
both the basic fissile material for weapons production, and the 
capacity to produce fissile materials. Two sorts of fissile materials are 
used in atomic weapons: plutonium (Pu-239) and uranium (U-235). 
Fission is caused in uranium when a neutron collides with U-235, one 
of three kinds of atoms in ordinary uranium, creating an isotope, 
U-236, that splits into two fragments, called fission products. The 
mass of the fission products is less than the mass of the U-236 
nucleus; it is this excess mass that becomes released energy. 
Another kind of atom in uranium, U-238, begins the chain 
reaction that results in plutonium. The U-238 nuclear is bombarded 
with slow neutrons, creating U-239, but fission is not caused in U-238 
by slow neutrons. Instead, the U-239 nucleus begins decaying by 
emitting electrons which change the chemical balance of the isotope. 
This decayed product, neptunium, also undergoes decay, producing 
the plutonium isotope Pu-239. In a nuclear reactor, plutonium is 
produced in steadily increasing quantities as the uranium fuel is 
consumed by fission; nuclear reactors are, therefore, of fundamental 
importance to proliferation. 
A reactor is essentially a furnace housing a self-sustaining chain 
reaction whose heat products are used to generate electricity. The 
fission process, through the emission of neutrons, initiates further 
fission in neighboring nuclei, sustaining the process continuously. To 
this process are added moderators, which slow the velocity of fast 
neutrons so that they can be captured by U-235, producing fission. 
Commercial power reactors are characterized by the type of modera-
24 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
tor used: graphite, light water (ordinary water), and heavy water (in 
which the hydrogen is replaced by deuterium). They are also 
characterized by the material used as the coolant, which acts as a 
heat conductor: gas, light water, or heavy water. (insert figure 2).43 
Figure 243 
Fission of U-235 and U-238 Leading to Plutonium Production 
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43. Barnaby, F.C.' How states can "go nuclear." 430 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 29, 31 <March 1977). 
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Light water reactors, which were developed mainly by the United 
States, contain ordinary water which is used as both moderator and 
coolant. These are the most common. Graphite-moderated, gas-cooled 
reactors have developed mainly in France and Great Britain, and 
were specifically developed to produce plutonium for these countries' 
nuclear-weapons programs. Heavy water reactors, developed mainly 
by Canada, are less common due to the scarcity and relatively high 
cost of heavy water. The plutonium produced by these reactors is not 
very efficient for atomic weapons because the fissile isotope of 
plutonium, Pu-239, is contaminated by other isotopes of the element, 
especially Pu-240. Weapons-grade plutonium should contain 10 
percent or less of these isotopes. But fuel rods left in the reactor for 
three or more years do produce suitable plutonium for bombs, 
although large amounts of plutonium would be needed, and overheat-
ing due to spontaneous fission could result. Currently, the amount of 
plutonium produced by non-nuclear-weapon states in peaceful nuclear 
reactors could theoretically produce 50 atomic bombs per week.44 
Plutonium may also be produced in research reactors, which are 
designed primarily to supply neutrons for experimental purposes or 
for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical or industrial use. 
Israel and South Africa are two countries that have managed to 
produce significant quantities of plutonium without commercial 
nuclear power plants. 45 
Unless extracted from the fuel elements, plutonium remains in 
the reactor. Chemical reprocessing plants are the medium through 
which plutonium is removed from the fuel rods. Worldwide capacity 
for reprocessing is small but growing as countries with significant 
nuclear power programs increase reprocessing demand to fuel future 
breeder reactors. There are currently eight countries with reproces-
sing capability, four of which are non-nuclear-weapon states. Five 
oth£:r nations, including Brazil and Pakistan, have facilities planned 
or under construction. 46 
Use of the breeder reactor is one of the most highly controversial 
technological innovations on the nuclear front. The fast-breeder 
reactor is different from other types in that it produces more fuel than 
44. Barnaby, F.C. How states can "go nuclear." 430 Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 29, 33 (March 1977). 
45. Guhin, M.A. Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom. American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Foreign Affairs Study, 23 (1976). 
46. World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1976. Almquist and 
wiksell, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Stockholm, 1976, at 46-47. 
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it consumes. In a breeder reactor the isotope U-238 converts to 
plutonium with a greater neutron surplus than is possible in an 
ordinary reactor by utilizing a "blanket" of U-238 around the core of 
the reactor. This neutron surplus accumulates a stockpile of fissile 
material which doubles in amount every ten years. The elements 
from the breeder blanket usually contain 95 to 98 percent Pu-239, 
considered to be weapons-grade plutonium, and original breeding 
may yield future breeder reactors that are actually fueled by 
weapon-grade plutonium. Widespread use of the breeder reactor will 
place significant amounts of this weapons-grade plutonium within the 
territories of dozens of states. Moreover, weapons-grade plutonium 
used as the core element of a later-generation breeder reactor does 
not need reprocessing to remove plutonium from the fuel elements 
because .th-ese elements are virtually pure plutonium. So a country 
does not need access to a reprocessing plant to obtain plutonium 
suitable for atomic weapons if plutonium has been stockpiled through 
a breeder program. 
Proponents of breeder reactors argue that breeders represent a 
renewable energy source that may eventually release a state from 
dependence on both oil-exporting nations and uranium-exporting 
nations. Opponents fear the same independence arguing that wide-
spread and indiscriminate use of the breeder will induce countries to 
obtain one and duplicate the technology clandestinely, beyond IAEA 
safeguards, leaving the option of weapon development open for 
speculation. If breeders were proven to be cost efficient, it would be 
much harder to question the motives behind a country's development 
or acquisition of breeder reactors. Even before the breeder reactor 
development, duplication of technology was a problem manifested by 
India's bomb, which was developed in an unsafeguarded plant using 
capability built up through safeguarded material from Canada and 
subsequently duplicated.47 (insert figure 3) 
There is yet another economic barrier to non-proliferation, but 
this barrier has less to do with the nuclear non-nuclear weapon state 
dichotomy than the growing ideological rift between some of the 
major nuclear technology exporters. These supplier states determine 
nuclear export policy on both the international and domestic levels, 
according to factors that are either predominantly economic, or 
polito-military in character. West Germany, for example, has given a 
47. Gleissner, J.D. Recent U.S. efforts to control nuclear proliferation. 10 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 271, 281 (1977). 
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primarily economic interpretation to the nuclear issue in its foreign 
policy, emphasizing domestic and international determinants primar-
ily concerned with worldwide nuclear markets, technological 
48. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Facts on Nuclear 
Proliferation: A Handbook for the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, 
94th Congress, 1st Sess. 216 (1975). 
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advancements, and trade or investment interests. Convinced 
that proliferation is inevitable, official interpretation of non-
proliferation responsibility is minimal. The emphasis placed on 
market dimensions has substantial policy implications in the growing 
competitiveness and level of nuclear trade, as current action in 
nuclear commerce involves the diffusion of weapons-sensitive tech-
nologies. Intense competition for react.or export orders creates incen-
tives to achieve the competitive advantage by offering package deals 
of reactor and fuel technology. Though the reactor sale is today a 
commonplace event, the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies used to obtain fissile materials poses a serious problem. 
French and German policies to transfer these technologies to such 
places as Pakistan and Brazil create a competitive situation where 
proliferation concerns run a poor second to market concerns. The U.S. 
·has responded to these policies by proposing alternatives to bilateral 
agreements, such as a multinational fuel cycle center, and by calling 
meetings of nuclear suppliers to consider self-imposed restraints on 
imports. But because these European countries are economically, 
rather than politically or security oriented, they are suspicious of U.S. 
attempts at export controls, believing that the United States is 
advocating restraint by other countries so that it can regain the 
virtual monopoly it once held on world nuclear technology. These 
countries assert that the U.S. is attempting to penalize European 
companies, and also point to the NPT and its loopholes as justification 
for breeder reactor and reprocessing plant sales.49 The failure of 
supplier states to reach ideological accord has been exploited both by 
the suppliers themselves and the countries whose rapid leap into the 
more advanced areas of nuclear technological development indicates 
potential weapons development. This challenges the premise that 
nuclear sales to countries possibly concealing their desire for nuclear 
weapons should be undertaken with special care. In the cur:rent 
status of nuclear export marketing, there is virtually no incentive to 
apply extra precautions or attach restrictions to nuclear sales, and 
even current IAEA safeguards and the NPT allow for considerable 
leeway. 
It can be surmised that technological restrictions will not 
effectively retard proliferation, not only because restraints on sales 
are ineffective in the competitive nuclear marketplace, but because 
with the state of knowledge worldwide, time alone could close the 
49. Wonder, E. Nuclear commerce and proliferation: Gennany and Brazil, 1975. 21 
Orbis 277, 277-278 (1977). 
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technological gap. As a political objective, nuclear proliferation is 
most effectively controlled in a political context, through development 
of a multilayered policy capable of producing an effect on the broad 
spectrum of non-nuclear states with their various motivations. 
III. U.S. policy and Pakistan prospects 
It is clear from the preceding that the NPT alone is inadequate as 
the sole non-proliferation deterrent. Economic, political, military, and 
technological considerations are not addressed by the treaty, which 
attempts to reduce non-I?roliferation to a purely legal issue. The 
principle motivations to retain or pursue a nuclear option are not 
countered or neutralized by the NPT. The objections to the treaty, 
raised primarily by non-signatories but also by signatories participat-
ing in the ~975 NPT Review Conference, have not resulted in any 
attempt to reduce the inequities of the treatment of non-nuclear-
weapons states under the treaty. And the policies of those nuclear 
weapons states who are signatories to the NPT have helped to foster 
rather than inhibit the development of nuclear weapons capabilities 
by threshold states. The United States in particular must accept 
responsibility for the current situation which its ambivalent re-
sponses to the spectre of proliferation have helped create. 
A. U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy 
The United States has not had a static non-proliferation strategy. 
Initially, during World War II and immediately thereafter, the 
non-proliferation policy was based on containment and secrecy. Along 
with Great Britain and Canada, the U.S. concluded a trilateral 
agreement in 1943 designed to restrict third-party access to both 
technology and uranium. This policy was also reflected in U.S. 
domestic legislation such as the McMahon Act, but lasted only as long 
as an effective monopoly of the two essential components of nuclear 
industry, uranium and technology, was maintained. 
The Lilienthal-Baruch Plan, presented to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, was also a manifestation of a 
containment philosophy. This plan proposed an international author-
ity to regulate and manage on a worldwide basis the field of atomic 
energy through "various forms of ownership, dominion, licenses, 
operation, inspection, research and management by competent per-
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sonnel."50 The Lilienthal-Baruch proposal was rejected by the Soviet 
Union because of the excessive constraints placed on the national 
sovereignity of countries wishing to d~velop nuclear technology. 51 
The containment strategy of non-proliferation lasted only until 
1953, when it became apparent that Soviet nuclear technology was 
becoming both competitive and diversified. This development meant 
that the Soviets, unencumbered by restrictive containment agree-
ments, would be in a position to disseminate the peaceful applications 
of its nuclear research. It was this commercially competitive aspect, 
combined with a newly emerging attitude which appeared to accept 
the inevitability of proliferation, that led to the adoption of a different 
non-proliferation stance by the United States. 
The new policy was revealed by President Eisenhower in 1953. 
Besides calling for an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
the proposal broke new ground from an American philosophical 
standpoint by envisioning widespread peaceful application of nuclear 
technology: 
The more important responsibility of the Atomic Energy Agency 
would be to devise methods whereby this fissionable material 
would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. 
Experts would be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs 
of agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities. A special 
purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy to the 
power-starved areas of the world. Thus the contributing powers 
would be dedicating some of their strength to serve the needs 
rather than the fears of mandkind. 
The United States would be more than willing - it would be 
proud to take up with others principally involved in the 
development of plans whereby such peaceful use of atomic energy 
would be expedited.52 
50. Address by Bernard M. Baruch to the United Nations Atomic Energy 
Commission I (June 14, 1946), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 
prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of 
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress. 2nd Sess. ( 19781. 
51. Guhin, M., Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom, American 
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research (1976), at 7 !1976). 
52. Address by Dwight D. Eisenhower to the United Nations General Assembly 
!December 8, 1953), reprinted in Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the 
Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess. !1978). 
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Thus, the United States prepared not only to accept what was 
considered by this time an almost inevitable progression toward 
nuclear industry, but to lead the way in advocating peaceful 
application of nuclear technology. The U.S. conveniently modified its 
non-proliferation strategy at a time when it could still expect to 
exploit its lead in nuclear technology in the marketplace. Until this 
point, U.S. priorities had placed international control over peaceful 
nuclear development. "Thereafter, development came first and inter-
national control and inspection second, if at all."53 
The Atoms for Peace address before the United Nations General 
Assembly began with a recitation of the fearful potential of atomic 
weapons while acknowledging that the United States arsenal of such 
weapons "of course" increases daily. It then went on to propose joint 
atomic contributions to the IAEA without even indicating the 
consequences in terms of weapons proliferation that widespread 
dissemination of nuclear technology would have, other than stating 
rather euphemistically that such steps would "hasten the day when 
fear of the atom will begin to disappear". The Atoms for Peace 
proposal also failed to confront the ideological disparity in professing 
nuclear disarmament while simultaneously stockpiling those same 
arms, a disparity which continues to plague U.S. efforts to halt 
horizontal proliferation. Nevertheless, the Atoms for Peace plan was 
welcomed by many in the international community, especially by 
developing countries intrigued by both the prestige associated with 
this new technology and its long-term potential for economic benefit. 
India in particular was in a position to benefit from the United States' 
newly co-operative stance, having established the necessary domestic 
intrastructure in the form of an Atomic Energy Commission as early 
as 1948.54 Over 1100 Indian scientists and engineers were trained in 
U.S. facilities during the Atoms for Peace period as India acquired the 
technical expertise to assemble the Apsara research reactor in 1956 
and complete a small reprocessing plant in 1964.55 
After initially lagging behind Great Britain, Canada, and France 
in the nuclear export race of the 1950's, the United States was able to 
capitalize on its monopoly of the enriched uranium field. "With the 
approval and help of the Government, [the American nuclear 
53. Guhin, M., Nuclear Paradox: Security Risks of the Peaceful Atom, American 
Enterprise Institute for Policy Research 11976l, at 11. 
54. Khan, M.A., Nuclear Energy and International Co-operation: A Third World 
Perception of the Erosion of Confidence, The Rockefeller Foundation/The Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, London, 1979, at 7. 
55. Id. 
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industry] was able to export some forty research reactors, less 
expensive than natural uranium fueled ones, to countries all over the 
world, some of which were not yet really ready to profit from such a 
sophisticated facility. American industry was also able to test on 
European grounds its not so 'proven' enriched uranium light water 
power reactors owing to a well-timed and financially favorable United 
States - European agreement."56 Besides technology and facilities, 
the United States alone was able to export enriched uranium, giving 
it an immeasurable commercial and political advantage. Essentially, 
U.S. policy by this point centered on the containment of "sensitive" 
reprocessing and enrichment technology by obviating the need of 
other countries to acquire such indigenous capability. Another basic 
tenet of U.S. policy was the requirement of safeguards, first through 
bilateral agreements and later under IAEA auspices. 
By the mid 1960's the United States was the undisputed leader in 
nuclear exports. The threat of Soviet competition never really 
materialized; the Soviets confined exports to countries in its orbit or 
who were politically friendly. The British never exported any power 
plants after their initial 1958 sales to Italy and Japan, while France 
sold only one natural uranium graphite moderated plant to Spain in 
1965.07 Canadian natural uranium fueled reactors did not gain the 
widespread acceptance that American enriched uranium reactors 
acquired, primarily because of the relative scarcity of the heavy water 
used as a coolant in Canadian reactors. Thus by the time negotiations 
began on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United States 
could afford the appearance of magnanimity in nuclear non-
proliferation negotiations though only to the extent such posturing 
did not disturb the status quo of the marketplace. 
The NPT did not receive the widespread acceptance that the 
nuclear powers had hoped. The discriminatory regime it promoted 
and the lack of security assurances in particular made it unacceptable 
to about twenty nations already possessing or planning a nuclear 
facility, including two nuclear weapons powers, France and China. 
But the United States· continued to rely on the NPT as its primary 
non-proliferation effort, at least until the mid 1970's. By that time, 
the Indian nuclear test explosion and renewed commercial competi-
tion in the export field from France and Germany convinced many 
56. Goldschmidt, B. A historical survey of non-proliferation policies. 2< 1) Interna-
tional Security 69, 73 <Summer, 1977). 
57. Goldschmidt, supra, at 73-74. 
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that the United States was losing its ability to effect its non-
proliferation goals. 
U.S. response to these developments was to consult with the 
other main nuclear suppliers to establish a reinforced export policy 
based on the common consent of these suppliers. Representatives of 
Great Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union 
and the United States met in London in 1975 to create new guidelines 
for export restrictions. At this point it became apparent that an 
ideological rift was developing among the exporting countries. Some, 
like the United States, wanted to erect technological barriers to 
proliferation by barring sales of reprocessing and enrichment plants, 
and sales of material that could be used for weapons. Other countries 
wanted to restrict such sales only to those countries which would not 
submit to IAEA inspection and verification. In any case, the overall 
effect of the London suppliers' meetings was the creation of a new 
discriminatory structure based on a supplier state/receiver state 
dichotomy in addition to the we11pon state/non-weapon state division 
previously created by the NPT. 
Today the United States continues to rely on supplier restraint as 
a major factor in curbing the prospect of proliferation. It pressured 
France to cancel its agreement with Pakistan to supply a reprocessing 
plant (which France did in 1978). South Korea also cancelled its 
reprocessing plant which was to be built with French assistance. The 
United States also tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Germany to 
modify its long-term agreement with Brazil which includes transfer 
to that country of complete fuel-cycle capability. Meanwhile, the 
United States proceeded with two major tactics designed to streng-
then its non-proliferation efforts. These tactics are the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the commissioning of the Interna-
tional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), completed in Febru-
ary, 1980. 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 197858 (hereinafter 1978 
Act) was aimed primarily at reducing technological incentives and 
capabilities to proliferate through several approaches: (1) by being a 
reliable supplier of nuclear fuel to those countries adhering to 
non-proliferation policies; (2) by promoting an international organiza-
tion which would ensure fuel supply and establish repositories for 
spent fuel; (3) by extending fuel assurances only to those countries 
willing to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear 
activities, and requiring such countries to forego establishment of any 
58. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. * 3201-!i 3282 Cl978l. 
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new enrichment or reprocessing facilities; (4) by promoting economic-
ally feasible alternatives to complete fuel cycle capability; (5) by 
improving the IAEA safeguards system; (6) by assisting in the 
development of non-nuclear energy resources; and (7) by negotiating 
with other nations to adopt common international sanctions against 
those countries violating the principles of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. Although this list of tactics appears to adequately neutralize 
the international tendency toward proliferation, the 1978 Act falls 
short of its goals for several reasons. 
Supply reliability is an incentive for a country to acquire the 
reprocessing or enrichment capability which would give it a self-
sustaining fuel cycle. Unfortunately, by the time the 1978 Act was 
adopted, the United States was already losing its reputation as a 
reliable supplier of nuclear fuel. As early as 1974, the United States 
Atomic Energy Commission had suspended the signing of all new 
contracts for the supply of enriched uranium.59 In addition, the 
restructuring of U.S. government responsibilities for nuclear activi-
ties in 1974 substituted an independent agency (the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission) for an executive agency (the AEC). The executive 
branch could not guarantee that the policy of absolute supply 
reliability would be given priority by the NRC. In addition, because 
the United States has not built new uranium enrichment facilities, it 
is no longer in a position to monopolize supply of enriched fuels. The 
Soviet Union began in 1971 to offer enrichment services to the 
Western world.60 Simultaneously, industrialized European nations 
began developing enrichment capability based on non-American 
technology, such as centrifuge plants and gaseous diffusion plants 
which in the coming decade will further erode U.S. monopolization of 
complete fuel cycle technology. 
The proposed International Nuclear Fuel Authority will face 
opposition of the same type encountered in proposals that the IAEA 
play the part of a nuclear materials bank. The major powers want to 
reserve for themselves the right to decide the recipients of nuclear 
transfers, as well as prescribe the commercial and political conditions 
under which such transfers will take place. 
The more stringent qualifications on fuel assurances have led 
since passage of the 1978 Act to the renegotiation of virtually all U.S. 
59. RibicofT, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales problem. 54 
Foreign Affairs 76, 764 (July 19761. 
60. Goldschmidt, B. A historical survey of non-proliferation policies. 211 t Interna-
tional Security 69, 78 !Summer 19771. 
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supply contracts to include prohibitions against reprocessing of such 
fuel. 6 ' Further requirements of IAEA safeguards on all peaceful 
nuclear activities and denial of indigenous reprocessing facilities will 
be bitterly contested by importers of U.S. enriched uranium. Such 
restrictions may be interpreted as designed to preserve the unequal 
status of non-nuclear-weapons states. The effect of this tactic may be 
to indirectly encourage proliferation in that some countries may be 
motivated to pursue reprocessing capability rather than rely on the 
United States assurances that there will be no suppression of 
assistance or further restrictive policies. 
The promotion of alternatives to complete fuel cy~le technology 
was to have been accomplished through the International Nuclear 
Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE). This study, commissioned by Presi-
dent Carter in 1977, brought together Western, Soviet bloc, and Third 
World scientists and technicians to review alternatives to widespread 
use of reprocessing plants and fast breeder reactors. "By organizing 
the 60-nation study, the U.S. sought world-wide endorsement of its 
decision to delay reprocessing and breeder reactors. . . . U.S. 
technicians also hoped the study would come up with engineering 
solutions to the plutonium problem, such as more efficient uranium or 
thorium nuclear-reactor cycles, which would eliminate the need for 
reprocessing and breeders."62 
Although initiated as a technical, apolitical exercise, the various 
groups of INFCE participants clearly hoped to justify their respective 
positions on breeders and reprocessing technology. The United States 
and Canada hoped to find support for their anti-plutonium stance. 
The West Europeans and Japanese hoped to ratify through consensus 
their view that there is no alternative to reprocessing technology, and 
that "nuclear consumers are unwilling to have their industrial and 
economic interests and security depend on bilateral political relations 
for an unspecified period."63 The Third World countries also expected 
that breeders and reprocessing would be sanctioned from an economic 
standpoint, giving respectability to efforts by those countries to 
obtain nuclear self-sufficiency through a complete fuel cycle capa-
bility. 
61. Franko. L. U.S. regulation of the spread of nuclear technologies through 
supplier power: lever or boomerang'? 10 Lau· and Policy in International Business 1181. 
1199 119791. 
62. International study will rebuff U.S. bid to block ~prPad of nuclear technology. 
Wall Street Journal. January 16. 1980. at 5. col. 1. 
63. Kapur, A. International Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and 
Repional A.~pects, Praeger Publishers. New York. 119791 at 104. 
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The resulting study, formally adopted in February 1980, dealt a 
blow to the anti-plutonium stance of the United States. By remaining 
a purely technical undertaking, the study minimized the non-
technological effects of widespread dissemination of reprocessing 
technology. In an exercise such as the INFCE, there was no way to 
balance economic benefits against proliferation dangers. Already, the 
conclusions of the INFCE have taken on broader political implica-
tions. For example, the U.S. domestic nuclear industry has used the 
INFCE to refute the Carter position that breeder technology contri-
butes to weapons proliferation.64 And should the United States 
continue to oppose breeders and reprocessing despite the INFCE 
report, this would provide more substance to the West European 
charge that U.S. objections to widespread acquisition of such technol-
ogy are based more on a desire to protect U.S. nuclear industry, which 
lags behind the Europeans in the reprocessing field, than on a 
legitimate fear of the military implications of such acquisitions. 
Improving the IAEA safeguards system may well aid in prevent-
ing proliferation. However, IAEA safeguards currently are respected 
and followed, and to date no weapons proliferation has resulted 
because of a violation of or inadequacy in the safeguards process. 
The development of non-nuclear energy resources is likewise a 
commendable gesture, but one which will not noticeably decrease the 
prospect of proliferation. If non-nuclear alternatives were vigorously 
pursued, this might be of psychological benefit in decreasing the 
amount of prestige associated with an extensive domestic nuclear 
industry. But even within the Carter administration the view has 
been expressed that alternatives will not supplant nuclear power in 
the foreseeable future: 
It is too early to be categoric about which energy sources will 
prove to be dominant by the middle of the next century. 
Governments should indeed go ahead with major development of 
solar and other renewable energy sources. But at a minimum, 
governments would be unwise to deprive themselves of the 
nuclear option during the early part of the century when the 
transition from oil and gas is likely to occur. A rapid transition to 
renewables is likely to be costly and to involve unforseen 
problems. A judicious energy policy, like any major social policy, 
should have flexibility and redundancy to protect against fail-
ures. On this basis, nuclear energy has a major role to play in 
64. Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1980, at 23, coL 8. 
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relation to the long run problem in the U.S. even if solar 
optimism proves to be justified. This is even more true for other 
countries with less access to fossil fuel resources to help buffer 
the transition to renewable energy technologies.65 
The development of international sanctions is perhaps the 
strongest deterrent to proliferation contained in the 1978 Act. The 
lack of effective and well-defined sanctions has left a gaping hole in 
international nonproliferation strategy. A stumbling block to the 
creation of international sanctions may be noted in the language of 
the 1978 Act, which refers to sanctions and procedures to be followed 
in the event of violations of "material obligations with respect to the 
peaceful use of nuclear materials and equipment or nuclear technolo-
gy, or in the event that any nation violated the provisions of the 
[Non-Proliferation] Treaty."66 Questions will undoubtedly be raised 
concerning the definition of "material obligations", as well as 
concerning the application of sanctions to those countries which have 
not accepted any obligations at all in the area of peaceful uses. In 
addition, questions will be raised as to the applicability of sanctions 
against those countries (the United States and Soviet Union) which 
do not appear to be fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the 
NPT, and those countries (particularly the United States) which 
appear to be reneging on their obligations under Article IV to 
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of peaceful nuclear technology. 
Any effort to impose sanctions on non-nuclear-weapon states while 
insulating weapons states from them would undoubtedly be roundly 
criticized. Besides, is it logical to rely on the prospective development 
of international sanctions when the world remained ominously silent 
following reports of a South.African nuclear explosion in the fall of 
1979? And is it credible to expect the United States to lead the way in 
enforcing the provisions of the NPT when it has continuously engaged 
in nuclear trade with nations who have refused to ratify the NPT 
(and thus are under no obligation not to produce nuclear weapons or 
to submit to safeguards of their nuclear activities)? "Of the 29 U.S. 
agreements for nuclear co-operations with other countries, no less 
than 13 are with non-NPT nations."67 
65. Address by JosephS. Nye at the Uranium Institute I July 12, 19781 reprinted in 
Reader on Nuclear Non-Proliferation, prepared for the Subcommittee on Energy, 
Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Sen•ices of the Senate Committee Governmental 
Affairs, 95th Congress, 2nd Sess. I 1978l. 
66. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201-§ 3282 I 1978!. 
67. Ribicoff, A. A market-sharing approach to the world nuclear sales problem. 54 
Foreign Affairs 764, 766 (July 1976!. 
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Thus, both the 1978 Act and the INFCE do not appreciiibly 
reduce the technological incentives to proliferate, and do not create 
effective barriers to proliferation. 
There are philosophical weaknesses in the United States' view of 
proliferation and the implementation of its policy that will continue 
to inhibit the effectiveness of its initiatives. United States initiatives 
have consisted primarily of attempts to maintain technological 
barriers to proliferation. The West Europeans in particular do not 
share the U.S. view that this is the most effective deterrent to 
proliferation. The United States has pursued these technological 
restrictions at the expense of a broader view of the incentives and 
corresponding disincentives to proliferate. Economic and political 
considerations have not been given adequate weight as contributing 
factors. Military motivations have been recognized, but the United 
States has not implemented security assurances which would greatly 
neutralize such motivations. Similarly, not enough credence has been 
attached to alternate views of the effectiveness of small nuclear 
arsenals, and their political significance. This last view, the "French 
view", is closer to the reasoning behind the PRC and Indian nuclear 
strategy, but has been minimized by U.S. policymakers. 
The United States has shown a willingness to compromise its 
non-proliferation goals in the face of commercial competition and 
more recently in the face of the perceived Soviet threat. As previously 
noted, the United States has not confined its nuclear trade to 
countries which have ratified the NPT. The original decision to 
promote the peaceful use of nuclear technology worldwide was made 
with cognizance of the domestic commercial advantages, and without 
an adequate appraisal of the proliferation implications. More recent-
ly, the willingness to aid and arm Pakistan in response to the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan demonstrates that pursuit of nonproliferation 
is not a priority in the current administration, despite professions to 
the contrary. The United States has also indicated that it will not 
press India for assurances that it will not detonate another nuclear 
device as a precondition to delivery of enriched uranium for the 
Tarapur nuclear power plant; rather, it seeks assurances only on -the 
use of American fuel and American-built facilties. 68 To avoid a 
"political breakdown" with India, the Carter administration recently 
asked Congress to approve a 40 ton sale of enriched uranium to that 
country despite Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's adamant refusal to 
68. New York Times, March 14, 1980. at A7. col. 1. 
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accept safeguards."9 Such policies evidence a commitment more to 
appearance than to non-proliferation. 
The United States no longer holds undisputed leadership in the 
peaceful nuclear industry, and must realize that it cannot impose its 
will or policies on countries in exchange for supply security. But the 
U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have not shown a willingness 
to give up anything in exchange for the sacrifices that a non-nuclear 
weapons state must make. No effort has been made to reduce the 
inequities in the NPT to make it more acceptable to the non-
signatories. On the contrary, the U.S. has supported a discriminatory 
supplier's policy following the London suppliers conference in 1975. 
The United States failed to persuade participants of the INFCE of 
its views regarding the proliferation dangers of complete fuel cycle 
capability. In addition, the United States has not taken the lead in 
developing ·and introducing alternatives to plutonium technology. 
"Although there are about 20 alternatives [to a plutonium nuclear 
fuel cycle] that can be discussed, there is little enthusiasm for 
re-examing items that have frequently been examined international-
ly and in national bureaucratic debates."'" 
Non-proliferation goals need a long-term strategy to be effective. 
This the United States has not had. For example, the Nixon 
administration, with Kissinger's encouragement, "had generally 
down-played the importance of the proliferation issue in American 
foreign relations, compared with the stress on the subject by the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations."71 The pressure to re-consider 
the danger and prospects of nuclear proliferation came from two 
directions: public opinion and the May 1974 Indian text. Neither 
source was apparently enough to convey the urgency of the situation. 
Carter, while appearing steadfast, has actually been equivocal in his 
implementation of proliferation strategy. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States has not 
diligePtly pursued a reversal of vertical proliferation. SALT II has 
been shelved in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But 
even SALT II is inadequate as a major step toward disarmament: at 
best, it delays serious consideration of vertical de-proliferation; at 
worst, it represents an abrogation of the responsibilities of nuclear 
weapons states under Article VI of the NPT. As critical as SALT II 
69. New realities give India reactor fuel. New York Times, May 11, 1980, at 2E. 
70. Kapur, A., Internatconal Nuclear Proliferation: Multilateral Diplomacy and 
Regional Aspects, Praeger Publishers, New York 11979J at 104. 
71. Kapur, supra, at 183. 
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may be toward controlling the nuclear arms race, it does not further 
to any extent the cessation of that race, or the prospects for a 
non-nuclear world. 
B. Prospects for Pakistan 
Having established the inadequacy of both the NPT and U.S. 
policy in controlling proliferation, what are the prospects for a 
threshold country such as Pakistan? Several factors have been 
identified as reasons why Pakistan is constrained from currently 
developing its nuclear option.72 For example, Pakistan does not 
recognize a distinction between weapons tests and peaceful nuclear 
explosions. It has also indicated that it will not conduct any 
explosives tests, whether for peaceful or military purposes. Pakistan 
has developed a self-image of scrupulousness in its honoring of 
international commitments, and is particularly critical of India's 
apparent lack of scruples. It has a weak nuclear industrial intrastruc-
ture, and also a dependence on intrusive external sources of nuclear 
materials. 
But such constraints are not absolute. Although it has declared 
that it will not test nuclear explosives, Pakistan has not committed 
itself to this posture through ratification of the NPT. The declaration 
not to test must also be weighed against the determination often 
expressed to achieve military equality with India. However honorable 
its posture of scrupulousness may be, Pakistan is unlikely to place 
scruples above national defense. Its weak nuclear industrial intras-
tructure is balanced by first rate equipment and technology. Its 
dependence on external sources of nuclear materials may be decreas-
ing. The cancellation of the French reprocessing facility may result in 
the growth of nuclear nationalism in Pakistan, a growth that would 
further remove Pakistani nuclear facilities from IAEA inspection and 
safeguards. (insert figure 4 )'3 
External threats to Pakistan's security may be increasing rather 
than decreasing, particularly in light of the Soviet threat posed by the 
invasion of Afghanistan. It would be fallacious to assume that 
Pakistan feels protected from India by the weight of world opinion, 
especially since India does not feel secure from possible Pakistani 
aggression. There is evidence of this in the Indian objections to U.S. 
aid to Pakistan.74 In addition, although Pan-Islamism does not appear 
72. See e.g. Kapur, supra, at 209-211. 
73. Source: compiled by author. 
74. New York Times, March 14, 1980, at A7, col. 1. 
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Figure 4'3 
Comparison of Nuclear Status of India and Pakistan'; 
India Pakistan 
1. Peaceful Nuclear Industry 
--research reactors Yes Yes 
--power reactors Yes (light water Yes lheavy water 
dominant I dominant I 
--breeder developments Yes No 
--gas centrifuge developments No Yes 
--fuel fabrication Yes IHyderabad- No 
under IAEA 
safeguards) 
-reprocessing Yes ITarapur and No 
--nuclear ~lectrical capacity 
Throm bay I 
31.4 OOOMWe 4.9 OOOMWe 11975: 
by 1980 5th in percentage 
of electricity 
supplied by 
nuclear plantsl 
2. Uranium Sources 
-government-owned mining & Yes Uranium reserves 
prospecting activities reported, 1975 
-est. annual plutonium 400 kg 30 kg 
production, 1980 
-est. accumulated stock 2500 kg 300 kg 
of plutonium, 1980 
3. Technology sources 
-reactors supplied by U.S. supplied by Canadian 
and Canadian companies 
companies 
4. Military Capacity nuclear capable nuclear capable 
delivery systems delivery systems 
5. Safeguards non-NPT safeguards non-NPT safeguards 
agreement with agreement with 
IAEA IAEA 
to be an immediate possibility, Pak-Islamism may be, with external 
strength south to compensate for any internal devisiveness. 
Besides these political factors, there are economic indications of 
Pakistan's propensity to proliferate. One is that Pakistan's nuclear 
plans clearly exceed what is regarded as the optimum level of nuclear 
energy for that country, as estimated by the IAEA. A second is that 
following the INFCE report, there are documented economic justifica-
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tions for a complete fuel cycle capability. Even if Pakistan were to 
continue to renounce its pursuit of nuclear weapons, it is unlikely 
that it would forego the chance to legitimately keep the option for 
weapons development open through economic justification for a 
reprocessing plant. 
It is widely accepted, in the United States and elsewhere, that 
Pakistan is an imminent proliferator. It is also widely acknowledged 
that a country need not detonate a nuclear device to be considered a 
threat to non-proliferation. What is not acknowledged is the extent to 
which the nuclear powers, and in particular the United States, must 
reform their attitudes and policies to deal effectively with the prospect 
of proliferation. 
C. Some implications for U.S. policy 
The first step in a reformed non-proliferation policy is to 
neutralize the military incentives to proliferate. Economic and 
political control will be most effective in the long run, but those 
countries on the threshold of nuclear weapons contemplate current 
military and security problems as immediate justification for a move 
toward a nuclear option. The United States must strike a delicate 
balance with respect to its policy toward imminent proliferators. On 
the one hand, the U.S. should avoid extending its nuclear umbrella to 
the point of risking involvement in remote conflicts and placing the 
U.S. civilian population in the position of nuclear hostages. On the 
other hand, non-nuclear states both demand and deserve adequate 
security guarantees in exchange for compliance with NPT policy. At 
the NPT Review Conference, the participants recognized the security 
of non-nuclear weapons states as a priority: 
Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their 
independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Confer-
ence emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and 
strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties 
which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It 
acknowledges that States Parties find themselves in different 
security situations and therefore that various appropriate means 
are necessary to meet the security concerns of States Parties. . . . 
At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts 
must be made especially by the nuclear weapons States Party to 
the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon 
States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both 
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, 
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in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the 
threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving 
either nuclear or non-nuclear-weapons. 
Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to 
the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take 
effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon 
States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of 
all practical means to this end, taking into account the views 
expressed at this Conference. 75 
From the point of view of a non-nuclear state, the ideal "security 
guarantee" would probably be a promise by one or more nuclear 
powers to come to its assistance should it be attacked by, or 
threatened by, still another nuclear power. 76 The assurances of 
Security Council Resolution 255 (Appendix B) are not very meaning-
ful to non-nuclear states because some states (like West Germany) 
felt specifically threatened by one of the guarantors. In addition, 
action taken through the Security Council, as is contemplated by the 
Resolution, is ineffective by nature because of the veto power held by 
every permanent member, each of which possesses nuclear weapons. 
And joint action may be stymied as the guaranteeing powers differ on 
proposed action, especially if the threat to use nuclear weapons is 
directed against one of their allies. U.S. decision-makers need to be 
cognizant of all these conflicting pressures before inducing NPT 
compliance though security guarantees it may later be unwilling to 
uphold. 
The second step toward proliferation policy is to downgrade the 
political significance of nuclear weapons acquisition. If the U.S. 
hesitates in pursuit of an aggressive de-proliferation policy, the world 
will not be convinced of the futility of nuclear weapons production. 
The U.S. should welcome the inception of nuclear-weapon-free zones 
because regional instability is the immediate catalyst of proliferation. 
The U.S. should also conclude a SALT Treaty with the Soviets that 
really is an arms limitation agreement, not a disguised vertical 
proliferation. And the U.S. should resist attempts to make the 
permanent Security Council members a nuclear "club" by elevating 
India's status or that of any future nuclear proliferator. 
75. Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons: Final Declaration. 14 International Legal Materials 1061, 1068-69 
<19751. 
76. Boskey, B., and Willrich, M., eds. Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects for Control. 
The Dunellen Company, Inc., New York, 1970, at 122. 
44 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES 
Unfortunately, there are conflicting goals at stake here. De-
emphasizing nuclear strength may lead to proliferation among 
countries such as West Germany that feel that allied nuclear 
capability is their only buffer between them and a coventional or 
nuclear attack. Inadequate political clout may even induce certain 
states to become or remain non-signatories to the NPT. And, in light 
of current capacity by states other than the United States to supply 
nuclear technology and equipment, the United States may have 
already passed the peak of its influence on the political motivations of 
possible proliferators. 
The final policy implications concern the rerouting of economic 
advantages to proliferation. Subtle methods toward this goal include 
development of nuclear reactors and other processing technology that 
neutralize any economic advantages of complete self-sustaining forms 
of nuclear energy production. Renewable forms such as solar energy 
and hydroelectric power must be pursued and developed, and made 
economically attractive to non-nuclear states. International control 
and management of the fuel cycle should also be encouraged. Reactors 
and plants can be designed to make plutonium extraction more 
difficult, costly and time-consuming. 
A more direct approach is to link economic assistance to NPT 
adherence. The U.S. is so far clearly unwilling to pursue this route, 
because of mutual economic interdependence and possible retaliation 
by the affected countries. However, this step may be reserved for 
major transgressors, and even non-parties, to the NPT. The U.S. must 
take notice of the fact demonstrated by India's nuclear explosion: that 
as a byproduct of a peaceful nuclear program, weapons development 
need not be expensive. Economic sanctions should be available after 
the fact of proliferation by a state, but must be definite enough before 
the fact to act as a deterrent. 
There are no cut and dried solutions to the prosped of prolifera-
tion. There are so many contingencies that cannot readily be brought 
under control and whose outcomes are too speculative to anticipate. A 
flexible policy with inflexible goals will be needed in the future to 
cope successfully with the complex and uncertain developments 
concerning nuclear weapons proliferation. As President Carter has 
noted, "the world is waiting, but not necessarily for long."77 
77. Carter, J., Three steps toward nuclear responsibility. Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 28, 32 (January, 1977). 
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61 
TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION 
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Parties to the Treaty", 
Considering the devastation that would be vislted upon all mankind 
by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every erfort to avert 
the danger or such a var and to take measures to safeguard the security 
or peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons vould seriously 
enhance the danger of nuclear war, 
In conformity vith resolutions of the United Nations General \•sembly 
calling tor the ~onclusion of an agreement on theprevention ot ~~~~ dis-
semination of nuclear weapons. 
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of Inter-
national Atomic Enel'gy Agency safeguards on peacerul nuclear activities, 
Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts 
to further the application, vithin the framework of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency safeguards system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively 
the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments 
and other techniques at certain strategic points, 
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of 
nuclear technology, in~luding any technological by-products vhich may be 
derived by nuclear-veapon States from the development of nuclear explosive 
devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the 
Treaty, whether nuclear-veapon or non-nuclear-weapon States, 
77Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Atomic Weapons, 1 July 1968 [1970]. UST 483, 
T.I.A.S. 16839. 
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Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties to the 
Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scien-
tific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other 
States to, the fUrther development of the applications of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes, 
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in 
the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective, 
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere in outer space and under 
water in its Preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions ~~ nuclear w;a~ons for all time and to continue ne~:~iations to 
this end, 
Desiring to fUrther the easing of international tension and the strength-
ening of trust between States in order to facilitate the cessation of the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stock-
piles, and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and 
the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
States must refrain in their international relations from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of 
any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations, and that the establishment and maintenance of international peace 
and security are to be promoted with the least diversion for armaments. of 
the vorld's h1mmn and economic resources, 
51 
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Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer 
to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weaponR or other nuclear explosive de-
vices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or in-
directly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-
weapon State to manufacture or othervise acquire uuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive de-
vices. 
ARTICLE II 
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to 
receive the transfer from any t:·ansferor vhatsoever of nuclear weap.::.ns or 
other nuclear explosive devices o~ of ~antral over such weapons or explo-
sive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear veapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek 
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices. 
ARTICLE III 
1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to 
accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiBted and concluded 
with the International Atomic Energy A6ency in accordance with the Statute 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards systec, 
for the exclusive purpose or verification or the fulfillment or its obliga-
tion• assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards 
required by this article shall be followed vith respect to source or special 
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enter into force not later than eighteen months after the date of initiation 
of negotiations. 
ARTICLE IV 
1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the in-
alienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, pro-
duction and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes vithout discrimina-
tion and in conformity vith articles I and II of this Treaty. 
2. All Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the 
right to participate in, the fUllest possible exchange of equipment, 
materials and scientific and technological information for the peacefUl uses 
of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also 
cooperate in contributing alone or together vith other States or international 
organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear 
enPrgy for peace.t'Ul purposes., espe:cially ii1 the tt::rri tc.ries at" non-nucleat·-
veapon States Party to the Treaty, vith due consideration for the needs of 
the developing areas of the vorld. 
ARTICLE V 
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that, in accordance vith this Treaty, under appropriate international 
observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential 
benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions vill be made 
available to non-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discrimi-
natory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used 
vill be as lov as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. 
Ron-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such 
benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements,·through 
53 
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fissionable material vhether it is being produced, processed or used in any 
principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards 
required by this article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable 
material in all peaceful nuclear activities vithin the territory of such 
State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anyvhere. 
2. Each State Party to the Treaty underto.kes not to provide: (a) 
source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especiallY 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special 
fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-veapon State for peaceful purposes, 
unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the 
safeguards required by this article. 
3. The safe~Jards required by this ar.icle shall be implemented in a 
manner designeil to c.:>mp1Y vith article IV of this Treaty, and to avoid 
hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties or inter-
national cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including 
the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the pro-
cessing, use or prod~.:ction of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in 
accordance vith the provisions or this article and the principle of safe-
guarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty. 
4, Non-nuclear-veapon States Party to the Treaty shall conclude agree-
ments vith the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet the requirements 
of this article either individually or together vith other States in acco~dance 
vith the Statuteof the International Atomic Energy Agency. Negotiation of 
such agreements shall commence within 180 days from the original entry into 
force of this Treaty. For States depositing their instruments of ratification 
or accession after the 160-day period, negotiation of such agreements shall 
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G.n appropriate international body vith adequate reprcsentat.~0n of ncm-nuelca.r-
weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as 
possible after the Treaty enters into force. lion-nuclear-weapon States Party 
to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral 
agreements. 
ARTICLE VI 
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general 
and complete disarmament under strict and effe.~tive international control. 
ARTICLE VII 
Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to con-
<:ll.1e regional treaties in order to assurP the tot•l absence or auclear 
weapo~ in their respective territories. 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. 
The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depositary 
Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. There-
upon, if requested to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the 
Treaty, the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to which they 
shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority or the 
votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties which, on the date 
the amendment is circulated, are members of the Board or Governors or the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment shall enter into force 
55 
56 CoNTEMPORARY AsiA!': Sn:mEs SERIEs 
6'( 
for ea~h Party that d~ro~its itn instrument of ratification of the amend-
ment upon the deposit of such instruments of r'<tification b•· a mujority of 
all the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon 
States Party to the Treaty and all other Parties vhich, on the date th~ ~~end­
ment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency. Thtreafter, it shall enter into force for any other 
Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the amendment. 
3 •. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference 
of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to 
review the operation o~his Treaty vith a viev of assuring that the purposes 
of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. At 
intervals of five years thereafter, a majority of the Parties to the Treaty 
may obtain, by 01•bmitting a proposal to this effect t.:> the Depositary Govern-
ll'ents, the con~ening of further conferences vith the same objective of re-
viewing the operation of the Treaty 
ARTICLE IX 
1. This ~eaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
vhich does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance vitb 
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
vith the Goverr.ments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
vhich are hereby designated the Depositary Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by the 
States, the Governments of vhich are designated Depositaries of the Treaty, 
PoLICY, PROLIFERATION AND THE NPT 
68 
and forty other States signatory to this Treaty and the deposit of their instru-
mt>nts of ratification. For the purposes of thb Treaty, a nuclear-weapon 
State is one vhich has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to Junuary 1, 1967. 
4. For States vhose instruments of ratification or accession are de-
posited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter 
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
aecession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and seceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit or 
each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into 
force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening 
a conference or other notices. 
6. This Treaty ~hal! be registered by the Dei-:>Sitary Governments purst!<:nt 
to article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE X 
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the 
right to vithdrav from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, 
relat~d to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice or such vithdraval to all 
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three 
months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary 
events it regards as having j~opardized its supreme interests. 
2. Tventy-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a con-
ference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force 
indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or p~riods. 
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This decision shall be taken by a ~Jority of the Parties to the Treaty. 
ARTICLE XI 
This Treaty, the English, Russian, Fr~nch, Spanish and Chinese .exts 
of vhich are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Depositary Governments. Duty certified copies of this Treaty shall be trans-
mitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signator;· 
and acceding States. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, duty authorized, have signed this 
Treaty. 
DONE in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscov, 
this first day of July ~e thousand nine hundred sixty-eight. 
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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 
ON SECURITY ASSURJ\IIt:ES 
Th~ s~ckrity Council, 
Noting wit~ appreciation the desire of a large number of States to sub-
scribe to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and thereby 
to undertake not to receive the transf~r from any transferor whatsoever or 
nuclear veapons or other nulcear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or 
otherwis~ acquire nuclear veapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not 
to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices, 
Taking into consideration the concern of certain of these States that, 
1. •. :onjunctiou .tith their adherenc" to the Tre""Y .on the Non-Proliferation nr 
Nuclear Weapons, appropriate measures be undert!\ken t•J safeguard their security, 
B~ng in mind that any aggression accompanied by the use of nuclear 
we a polls would endanger the peace and security of all States, 
1. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat of such 
aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would create a situation in 
which the Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon State permanent 
members, would have to act immediately in accordance vith their obligations 
under the United Nations Charter; 
2. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain States that they will 
provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance vith the Charter, to 
any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the llon-Proli ferat ion or 
Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act or an object or a threat of,aggression 
Resolution on S~curit Assurances. S/RES/ 
PoLicY, PRoLIFERATION AND THE NPT 
in vhi~h nuclear venpon5 are used; 
3. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, recot;nized under Article 
51 or the Charter, of individual and collective self-defense it an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council 
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace ar.d security. 
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